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Abstract 
 
 During the Second World War, Germany unleashed a relentless U-boat campaign against 
shipping in the coastal waters of the United States.  While most of this campaign was fought in 
the Atlantic Ocean, merchantmen in the Gulf of Mexico also received their fair share of U-boat 
attacks.  The presence of the U-boats in the Gulf was brief but endangered vital merchant 
shipping, and the U.S. armed forces had to meet this threat.  In nearly all aspects of defending the 
Gulf Coast and improving antisubmarine warfare, civilians participated with a will.  Civilians 
were involved in reporting U-boat activity, monitoring coastal waters, reporting any suspicious 
activity, and performing numerous other tasks that aided the defense of the Gulf Coast.  Even as 
the threat faded, civilian volunteers continued to act as coast watchers as a means to maintain 
home front morale. 
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Introduction 
One night Felicien “Dudu” Vizier went crabbing on the beach of a small island 
community in south Louisiana.  While going about his business on the especially dark night, 
Vizier suddenly found himself surrounded by a group of armed men.  Hardly speaking any 
English, as Cajun French was his native tongue, Vizier mustered only a few words: “Don’t 
shoot! It’s me, Dudu!”  Much to Vizier’s relief, these men were not pirates, rum runners, or fish 
thieves looking to rob a Cajun fisherman.  They were members of the United States Coast Guard, 
and they were looking for Germans.1 
 Upon the United States’ entry into the Second World War, the German navy expanded its 
U-boat campaign to the coastal waters of the continental United States.  To meet this threat, the 
United States formed three frontiers, the East Sea Frontier, the Caribbean Sea Frontier, and the 
Gulf Sea Frontier to create a unified coastal defense.  German U-boats spread fear across all the 
frontiers and inhibited all forms of maritime transport.  These attacks led to both an increase in 
paranoia in the civilian population and an increase in fortifications by the U.S. military along the 
three frontiers.  The Gulf Sea Frontier experienced the majority of its attacks by the U-boats in 
1942.  During this time stories spread among Gulf Coast locals that Germans were coming 
ashore at night.  Meanwhile, the United States Navy and Coast Guard explored every possible 
action they could imagine to stymie German agents from coming ashore.   
 This paper will explore how the civilian population and the United States military 
responded to the German U-boat attacks in the Gulf of Mexico. This paper will explain how 
these collaborative efforts of the United States military and the civilian population created a 
sound defense of the Gulf Coast’s coastal waters.  By examining these efforts this paper 
 
1 This story about Felicien Vizier was told to the author by the author’s grandmother, Vernice Vizier 
Brunies. 
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contributes to the larger story of the Battle of the Atlantic that is often overlooked by prior 
studies.  It puts an emphasis on civilian involvement in the defense of the home front.  To 
understand how the U-boats affected the reactions and responses of the people on the Gulf Sea 
Frontier, it is important first to understand how the U-boats started their campaign and rapidly 
expanded their hunting grounds from the Eastern seaboard of the U.S. all the way to the Gulf 
Coast. 
Engaging the Enemy 
 The German U-boat campaign was already in full effect by 1942.  The first major U-boat 
offensive occurred in the North Sea against the British in 1940.  In February of 1941, Adolf 
Hitler told his naval staff to investigate the feasibility of a U-boat attack on U.S. naval bases on 
the East Coast.2  Admiral Karl Dönitz, the U-boat commander, advocated a major strike, 
believing the United States did not have aa reliable system of anti-submarine warfare.  The naval 
staff did not agree, and called off the operation.  Once the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, 
Dönitz once again advocated for an offensive.  On December 12, 1941, Hitler formally approved 
an attack but only on U.S. merchant shipping.3 
 Operation Paukenschlag (Drumbeat), was the result of Hitler’s authorized attack on the 
Eastern shipping routes.  U-boats utilized both direct attacks with torpedos as well as mine laying 
operations.4  The attacks continued through January 1942 with great success.  By late February 
1942, the U-boats started to hunt beyond the East Sea Frontier into new waters.  Soon the 
 
2 Michael Gannon, Operation Drumbeat: The Dramatic True Story of Germany’s First U-Boat Attacks 
Along the American Coast in World War II (New York, NY: HarperCollins, 1990), 69-70. 
3 Ibid., 71. 
4 Samuel Eliot Morison, History of Naval Operations in World War II: The Battle of the Atlantic, September 
1939 – May 1943 (Urbana and Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1947),137. 
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Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico became part of the larger U-boat campaign.5  The decision to 
expand beyond just the eastern seaboard was made by Admiral Dönitz once he realized the 
organization of convoys made a southward shift and that shipping in the Gulf lacked a convoy 
system.  This shift made the expansion into the Gulf and the Caribbean desirable for the U-
boats.6   
The U-boats arrived in the Caribbean in late February and by the end of April 1942, they 
had sunk 300 merchant ships.7  The initial estimates for U-boats entering the Gulf varied from no 
U-boats venturing into the Gulf to large numbers dropping commandos on the shore to commit 
acts of sabotage.8  While neither of the extreme estimates came about, the first attacks in the Gulf 
started in May of 1942 when U-507 patrolled deep into the Gulf of Mexico.9 
The Gulf Sea Frontier already existed prior to the U-boats’ arrival in the Gulf.  Each 
frontier overlapped with the existing Naval Districts.  A naval officer using the title of 
commandant operated each district.  These commandants oversaw the operations in their 
respective districts.  The Gulf Sea Frontier consisted of the Seventh and Eighth Naval Districts.  
The Eighth Naval District covered all waters from Texas to portions of the Florida panhandle.  
The Seventh Naval District covered the remainder of Florida.  Combined, these two districts 
made up the Gulf Sea Frontier.  Most of the activity in the Gulf of Mexico was in the Eighth 
Naval District, with much of the Seventh Naval Districts activity occurring on the East coast of 
Florida.  Each of these districts would work with the commander of the Gulf Sea Frontier to 
combat the U-boat threat. 
 
5 Ed Offley, The Burning Shore: How Hitler’s U-Boats Brought World War II to America (New York, NY: 
Basic Books, 2014), 124-125. 
6 Morison, The Battle of the Atlantic, 137. 
7 Jürgen Rower, Axis Submarine Successes, 1939-1945 (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 
1983), 73-92. 
8Morison, The Battle of the Atlantic, 136. 
9 Homer H. Hickam, Jr, Torpedo Junction (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1989), 218. 
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Zone Chart of Gulf Sea Frontier, RG 181, Box 142. 
The Navy knew it was only a matter of time before the U-boats would enter the Gulf.  To 
prepare for this eventuality, the Atlantic Fleet’s Anti-Submarine Warfare Unit (ASWU) issued 
bulletins to the Naval Districts.  The purpose of these bulletins was to prepare the Naval Districts 
to combat the U-boat threat.  Having started to learn the enemy’s tactics, the Atlantic Fleet’s 
ASWU provided information of known German methods of submarine warfare.  One bulletin, 
dated March 14, 1942, covered the presence of suspected U-boat resupply ships flying under 
neutral flags.  The Navy asked that merchant vessels investigate suspicious ships who may be 
signaling U-boats for resupply and refueling.10  The bulletin went on to describe various methods 
of deception used by German U-boats to lure in merchant vessels. 
One method of deception used by the German U-boats in the Atlantic was when all the 
survivors of a sunken ship would be killed and the Germans would then board the life rafts with 
the hopes that after being picked up by U.S. authorities, they could infiltrate American ports 
 
10 Anti-Submarine Warfare Unit Information Bulletin #2, 14 March 1942, Box 141, RG 181, NAFW. 
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under the guise of U-boat attack survivors with the intention of committing espionage or 
sabotage.11  The report does not indicate whether this tactic was effective or to the extent that it 
was used.  This bulletin goes on to detail specific methods for countering and sighting U-boats, 
and ended with a clear statement.  “On a deliberate attack, every effort must be made to destroy 
the submarine.”12  With the high rate of attacks, the Navy was adamant about not letting the U-
boats escape.  A letter from the Commandant of the Eighth Naval District to the Commander of 
the Gulf Sea Frontier from April of 1942 requested support in leading an aggressive offensive to 
“locate and destroy all enemy submarines entering [the Eighth Naval District].”13  The Navy 
intended to utilize all available means to combat the U-boat threat. 
The military developed methods of anti-submarine warfare while the attacks occurred in 
the Atlantic, but some measures existed to defend the Gulf Coast prior to the United States 
entrance into the war.  As early as December 1940, the Coast Guard exchanged letters with the 
Commandant of the Eighth Naval District to prepare to meet the emergency demands for 
blackouts if needed within the New Orleans District.14  Starting in January 1942, the Office of 
the Commandant of the Eighth Naval District began to send letters to state coordinators for 
civilian defense to seek the cooperation and ensure the enforcement of blackouts across the entire 
Gulf Coast.  These letters were addressed to owners of “lighted bridges and maintainers of 
private lighted aids to navigation and other lights in or over navigable waters of [the Eighth 
 
11Previously cited Anti-Submarine Warfare Unit Information Bulletin #2, 14 March 1942, Box 141, RG 
181, NAFW. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Report from Commandant, Eighth Naval District, to Operating Forces, Eighth Naval District, 20 April 
1942, Box 2, RG 181, NAFW. 
14 Letter from Commander, New Orleans District, to Commandant, Eighth Naval District, 17 December 
1940, Box 145, Naval Shore Installations Records of Commandant RG 181, The National Archives at Fort 
Worth, Texas. 
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Naval District].”15  The purpose of these letters was that in the event that a black out or air raid 
notice was issued, it would reach the operators of these lights in a timely manner.  It is clear that 
the Navy knew that civilian collaboration was necessary to providing a meaningful defense to the 
coast. 
The primary means of coastal defense patrols prior to May of 1942 were air patrols, 
surface patrols, and striking groups all of which utilized the anti-submarine warfare tactics issued 
in the Atlantic Fleet’s bulletins.  The air patrols would monitor the transportation lanes within 
their range.  If an air patrol was to catch sight of a U-boat, it was to attack with depth charges 
and machinegun fire until surface patrols could enter the area.  Surface patrols were to attack 
with depth charges in the event of a confirmed contact as well as with “guns of any caliber” if 
the U-boat was on the surface.  If the surface patrol lost sight of the U-boat, they were to search 
the area for at least twenty-four hours and assist air patrols in searches if they made first contact.  
Attacking a visible U-boat was so important that the surface ships received orders not to rescue 
survivors if they are engaged with the enemy.  Only in the event of a plane crash should the 
surface patrols abandon their attacks.  Striking groups would deploy only in the event of positive 
contact with a U-boat.  These striking groups were primarily air strike groups deployed from the 
closest naval air stations.  Additional striking groups, in the form of planes, were also available 
from the U.S. Army if required.16 
May 1942 was the first month since the beginning of the war in which the German U-
boats sank over one hundred ships across all frontiers.17  During May, the Gulf Sea Frontier had 
 
15 Letter from F. J. Birkety, Commander, U.S. Coast Guard, via Commandant, Eighth Naval District to 
State Coordinator for Civilian Defense, 3 March 1942, Box 142, RG 181, NAFW. 
16 Previously cited letter from Commandant, 8ND, to Operating Forces, 8ND, 20 April 1942, Box 2, RG 
181, NAFW. 
17 Rower, Axis Submarine Successes, 92-101. 
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a higher amount of sinkings than all other frontiers with a total of forty one ships lost, resulting 
in a loss of 219,867 gross tons.18  Plans were in place to defend the Gulf Coast, both with 
military action and civilian cooperation.  However, these plans did not stop the initial onslaught 
of attacks when the U-boats entered the Gulf.  This amount of devastating loss persisted in the 
Gulf for most of the summer of 1942.  By June and July, the District War Plans Officer was 
looking to expand the coastal defenses to curtail these losses.  The Navy started to acquire 
portions of coastal lands to act as operating bases for both surface and aircrafts.19   
Bases sprouted up along the entire Gulf Coast.  These bases included Coast Guard patrol 
stations, naval air stations, and USAAF airfields.20  The naval air stations also desired to utilize 
lighter than air means to search for U-boats.  Two such lighter than air, usually abbreviated as 
LTA, naval air stations existed within the Eighth Naval District.  In 1942, the Navy 
commissioned NAS Hitchcock and NAS Houma.21  The desire to use airships to search for U-
boats did not become a reality until 1943 when the bases were completed.22  This was just the 
beginning of the military’s planning to defend against a much longer and extensive German 
campaign against the Gulf Coast.  The means to fight against the U-boats were steadily 
expanding, but another issue was present.  Hundreds of sailors were being cast into the sea by U-
boat attacks.  Their rescue was vital not only for their individual survival, but for the war effort. 
The survivors of a U-boat attack were eyewitnesses to the tactics used by these U-boats.  
If recovered, they could provide vital information that could assist in anti-submarine warfare or 
 
18 Morison, The Battle of the Atlantic, 142. 
19 Report from District War Plans Officer to District Public Works Officer, 8 June 1942, Box 2, RG 181, 
NAFW. 
20 Chart of military installations New Orleans Sector, Box 4, RG 181, NAFW. 
21 Letter regarding LTA Program, 21 September 1944, Box 3, RG 181, NAFW. 
22 C. J. Christ, “Blimps Stationed in Houma Play a Major Role in World War II,” in WWII in the Gulf of 
Mexico (Louisiana: Self-published, 2005), 60. 
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give insight into the U-boats next destination.  The Navy instituted various protocols for the 
recovery of survivors and their subsequent screenings by members of the Office of Naval 
Intelligence (ONI).  The Navy became highly proficient in the recovery of survivors and the 
writing of sinking reports based on their testimony. 
Learning from Survivors 
With the number of patrols in the Gulf, it did not take long to spot survivors of sinkings.  
Upon the discovery of survivors, numerous orders went out immediately to various offices 
within the Eighth Naval District.  The District Operations Office would notify a string of other 
offices upon retrieval of the survivors and issued the number and general information about the 
survivors and the ship they were aboard.  Then the District Disbursing Office would arrange the 
transportation of these survivors to any necessary locations.  The District Intelligence Office 
would interview survivors along with the initial reports given to the Operations Office by 
survivors.  The Intelligence Office would notify any ship owners of the status of their vessels as 
well as the Medical Office if any were injured from the attack.  The District Public Relations 
Office would get any information from any of the previous offices for public release if the Navy 
felt such a release was necessary.23  It was from these interrogations that the Navy found some of 
its most valuable information regarding the U-boats.  The District Intelligence Officer would 
compile extensive reports for each sinking with the information coming directly from witness 
accounts. 
When the STS R. W. Gallagher was sunk on July 13, 1942, the Navy had a full report on 
the sinking by July 15.  The reports provide as much detail as possible to help understand the 
nature of the attack.  The R. W. Gallagher was sailing from Baytown, Texas en route to Port 
 
23 Report from the Commandant, Eighth Naval District, to numerous officers of the Eighth Naval District, 
15 May 1942, Box 145, RG 181, NAFW. 
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Everglades, Florida.  It was hit by two torpedoes at around four in the morning about eighty 
miles from the Southwest Pass of the Mississippi River.  The report goes on to list the bearing of 
the ship, its speed, the time it took to sink, where the torpedo hit, and numerous other statistics 
about the status of the ship prior to and during the sinking.  Later in the report, a summary of 
witness testimonies is written.  Special attention is made to the presence of U.S. and British 
codes on board the ship.  The Navy prioritized finding out if Allied codes fell into enemy hands.  
The survivors of the R. W. Gallagher noted that there were both U.S. and British codes aboard 
and those codes were presumed to have gone down with the ship.  The reports also asked for 
detailed information about the U-boat, if any was available.  The details of the U-boat that sunk 
the R.W. Gallagher were vague.  Witnesses described a bluish-gray color and the figures “U-28” 
written on the side of the conning tower.24  
 The witness who claimed to see the “U-28” figure was a storekeeper aboard the R. W. 
Gallagher named A. P. Hubbard.  On the day of the sinking, an agent with the Office of Naval 
Intelligence named W. J. Kirsch Jr interviewed Hubbard.  Hubbard told Kirsch that he and two 
others boarded a lifeboat on the port side of the ship where they witnessed the U-boat on the 
surface of the water, the only light coming from the burning oil of the R. W. Gallagher.  No other 
witnesses were able to get as clear a description of the German submarine as described by 
Hubbard.25  These witness accounts were very helpful but could also be misleading at times.  
That is due to the fact that these witnesses, especially in the case of Hubbard, were already 
traumatized by the dramatic sinking of their ship only to be interviewed by the Navy soon after.  
This could lead to confusion and even false information.  In the case of Hubbard’s account, he 
 
24 Report from District Intelligence Officer, Eighth Naval District, to Commander in Chief, United States 
Fleet, 15 July 1942, Box 27, RG 181, Naval Intelligence, NAFW. 
25 Ibid. 
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stated that he saw U-28, but U-28 was not the U-boat that sunk the R. W. Gallagher.  U-28 was 
stationed around Great Britain until it sank in a diving accident in March of 1944.26  In reality, it 
was U-67 that sunk the R. W. Gallagher.27  It is even possible that there was not even a number 
on U-67 since at the beginning of the war the U-boats removed their fleet numbers from their 
conning towers to prevent the use of their designation against them.28  It is unclear as to how 
Hubbard came up with the number he claimed to see. 
 Even if the accounts of eyewitnesses were not completely accurate, it did not invalidate 
their importance to the Navy.  In some cases, the survivors of the sinkings were the only people 
to make direct contact with the U-boat crews.  Just as the Navy needed intelligence regarding the 
locations of the U-boats, the Germans need information regarding the ships they were sinking.  
When the SS Tachira was sunk on July 12 by U-129 en route to New Orleans from Colombia, 
the survivors soon found themselves not only stranded at sea but being questioned by the very 
people who sank their ship.  The summary of the report from the survivors of the Tachira states 
that the U-boat surfaced about five minutes after the sinking.  Seven men came on deck.  One 
was the U-boat captain, Captain Hans-Ludwig Witt, whose name was unknown to the survivors.  
The others were an officer who questioned the survivors while a crewman aimed a machine gun 
at the them.  The remaining men were lookouts who stayed on the conning tower of U-129.  The 
interrogation consisted of the where the ship was going, where it came from, what was the cargo, 
and if the ship had passed through the Panama Canal.  Once the questions were answered the 
 
26 Paul Kemp, U-Boats Destroyed: German Submarine Losses in the World Wars (London: Arms & 
Armour, 1997), 178. 
27 Robert M. Browning Jr., U.S. Merchant War Vessel Casualties of World War II (Annapolis, MD: Naval 
Institute Press, 1996), 184. 
28 Gannon, Operation Drumbeat, 24. 
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crew gave a few bandages to the survivors before sailing off.29  These interrogations were not 
uncommon.  In some cases, the Germans would take a survivor on board the U-boat for the 
interrogation.30 
 On a few occasions, the U-boats would sink ships close to the coastline.  Military 
personnel and civilian fisherman often picked up the survivors of these attacks, such as the case 
of the Benjamin Brewster which was sunk just off the Louisiana coast.  Fisherman recovered the 
survivors and brought them to Grand Isle, Louisiana before being transferring them over to the 
Coast Guard.31  Numerous civilians lived directly on the coastline.  In Louisiana, most were 
fisherman who were not drafted into service as their fishing was a vital part of food production 
on the Homefront.  However, fishing became difficult once the U-boats entered the Gulf of 
Mexico.  To better protect the civilian fisherman and other merchant vessels, the Navy and the 
Coast Guard instituted various regulations on fishing. 
 The primary fear was that larger fishing vessels would fall prey to U-boat attacks.  In 
many cases the fishing boats were small enough to not be targets.  Fishing boats large enough 
were told specific times, locations, and depths that they could safely fish.32  Anyone that wanted 
to operate a fishing boat did have to obtain a Coast Guard identification card and have it on them 
at all times.  To get these identification cards, the fisherman had to fill out a form describing their 
boat and its mechanical characteristics.  These fishermen were given a guide to radio operations 
and made to sign an oath acknowledging that they would follow the new radio regulations.33  
 
29 Report from District Intelligence Officer, Eighth Naval District, to Commander in Chief, United States 
Fleet, 27 July 1942, Box 27, RG 181, NAFW. 
30 Gannon, Operation Drumbeat, 57. 
31 Browning, U.S. Merchant War Vessel Casualties, 181. 
32 Memorandum from J. J. Gidiere, Captain of the Port, New Orleans, to Commander McKean, 25 June 
1943, Box 2, RG 181, NAFW. 
33 Radio Instructions for Offshore Commercial Fishermen, Box 2, RG 181, NAFW. 
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During the day, fishing, both commercial and recreational, received very few restrictions, but by 
nightfall the restrictions increased tenfold.  Ships had their running lights reduced to an absolute 
minimum and could not get within one hundred yards of bridges or the waterfront.34  Local 
newspapers would publish these anti-sabotage regulations to better disperse this information.35 
Coastal Watchers 
Civilian involvement was not limited to observant fisherman.  In July 1942, Five Civil 
Air Patrol bases were commissioned across the coasts of Louisiana and Texas.36  These patrol 
bases allowed civilians to fly planes for patrol missions along the coast.  Training to be a pilot 
was not possible for everyone in these coastal communities.  Therefore, some were also sought 
to operate as observers from the coast.  The Coast Guard acted as the primary military means of 
coastal observation, but they found a need to expand this program into the civilian population.  
This led to the Coastal Observer System.  This system sought out reliable informants in both 
large and small communities who could not only report quickly but knew what to look for in 
their observations.  These informants were carefully selected and trained to write up reports.  
This system also involved having the local Coast Guard officers assess their knowledge of the 
surrounding coastal regions.  The goal of this system was to fill in the gaps in the knowledge of 
the Gulf Coast.37 
The Coastal Observer System was the result of a long existing desire for active coastal 
information provided to each Naval District’s intelligence officer on a regular basis and from 
reliable sources.  This desire for active observations was made in the Coastal Information 
 
34 Regulations for Fishing Craft Operating in the Eighth Naval District, 21 July 1943, Box 2, RG 181, 
NAFW. 
35 “Rules to Permit Fishing at Night,” The Times Picayune, 4 August 1943. 
36 Memorandum on Civil Air Patrol, 9 July 1942, Box 1, RG 181, NAFW. 
37 Report from the Officer in Charge, Section B-8, to District Intelligence Officer, Eighth Naval District, 8 
September 1942, Box 5, RG 181, NAFW. 
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Manual in July of 1941.  Following the United States’ entry into the war, all district 
commandants needed to find reliable civilian sources for coastal information.  The system was 
steadily developed and first implemented in the Fifth Naval District in May of 1942.  It would 
not be until June 1942 that the Eighth Naval District would begin to officially recruit observers.  
By the end of the summer of 1942, the Coastal Observer System was fully operational in the 
Eighth Naval District and was being extended to all other Naval District at the recommendation 
of Admiral Ernest J. King.38 
Training was crucial for the members of the Coastal Observation System.  Numerous 
individuals took part in the program.  While the program was a voluntary one, the Navy did ask 
specific individuals to join.  The reasoning often came from an individual’s knowledge of a 
specific area on the coast.  Even if the person was knowledgeable about the area, the Navy had to 
teach them what was considered valuable information and what was considered useless 
information.  The report outlining the details of the Coastal Observer System states that they had 
to carefully instruct volunteers to avoid the submission of “exaggerated, misleading or inaccurate 
reports.”  The Navy found promising results from the Observer System and believed that it was 
adequately spotting suspicious activity and deterring possible information or supply gathering 
operations with U-boats on the coast.39 
 The manual for the Coastal Observers was a four-page document issued to all coastal 
observers.  The manual lists the type of activity that these observers were looking for along the 
coast.  These activities varied widely.  The most typical activity was communications, such as 
blinking lights at night and visual signals during the day.  Strange radio interference or even 
 
38 Previously cited report from the Officer in Charge, Section B-8, to District Intelligence Officer, Eighth 
Naval District, 8 September 1942, Box 5, RG 181, NAFW. 
39 Ibid. 
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unusual radio equipment was considered reportable activity.  With all civilian craft having to 
register their radio equipment with the Coast Guard, any additional equipment was met with 
suspicion.  Specific criteria on what to look for between small crafts and larger crafts also 
existed.  In the case of small craft, observers would watch for excessive amounts of radio 
equipment, loitering for no observable reason, and or carrying excessive amounts of crew.  In the 
case of larger vessels, the observers had to look for ships operating in unusual transport lanes, 
any signs of sabotage, or collisions involving other vessels.40 
If in any case an observer witnessed any activity listed in the manual, they were told to 
report to the Eighth Naval District.  If the information was not an emergency, they were 
permitted to mail the reports to the Office of the District Intelligence Officer, located in New 
Orleans.  If it was emergency information, they were to contact the Navy by the quickest 
possible means, telephone being the listed example in the manual.  The manual goes on to 
emphasize that if the matter is truly urgent, the observer is to report the situation to the nearest 
Coast Guard Station who would then take appropriate action and contact the appropriate 
agencies.41 
Keeping a watch on coastal activity was important to the Navy, but there were also 
concerns over the local population.  Due to this concern, the observers were also tasked with 
monitoring the activity of the people in their own towns.  Suspicious individuals were those who 
wandered to isolated areas frequently, professed an unusual interest in military activities, and 
individuals who expressed sympathy with the enemy nations.  The Navy took rumors very 
seriously.  A person was considered suspicious if they spread any rumors discrediting the allies 
or emphasized the strength of the enemy powers.  The manual gives many specific examples of 
 
40 Instructions to Coastal Observers, 1942, Box 5, RG 181, NAFW. 
41 Ibid. 
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suspicious activity, but also leaves room for interpretation by individual observers.42  The desire 
to turn the gaze of the Coastal Observer System back onto land brought some contention with 
other intelligence gathering organizations. 
An officer from Intelligence Zone 4 of the Eighth Naval District noted in a report to the 
District Intelligence Officer that the FBI was criticizing the system.  The complaints from the 
FBI regarded an overlap in intelligence gathering operations.  The FBI stated the naval activity 
was within the purview of the Coastal Observers, while the information about possible 
suspicious activity on the shore was under the jurisdiction of the FBI.  During the weekly 
conference between the FBI and the Office of Naval Intelligence, a Special Agent expressed 
concern over the manual issued to Coastal Observers and demanded that the FBI should receive 
all information not regarding naval activity.43  Issues between these intelligence gathering 
agencies did arise on occasion, but for the most part the FBI and the Office of Naval Intelligence 
had a cooperative relationship.44 
The Navy was aware that the goal of the U-boats was to disrupt U.S. shipping.   They had 
succeeded at that goal for a time and the fear of the U-boats returning to the Gulf prevented a 
return to independent merchant vessel sailing.45  With the creation of an effective convoy system 
in the Gulf and along the Eastern Seaboard, the amount of attacks lessened.  By the end of 
August 1942, no more U-boats would attack merchant vessels in the Gulf until a small number of 
attacks occurred in 1943.  After 1943, no more attacks occurred in the Gulf as the Allies started 
 
42 Previously cited Instructions to Coastal Observers, 1942, Box 5, RG 181, NAFW. 
43 Report from Officer-in-Charge, Zone 4, 8ND, to District Intelligence Officer, 8ND, 3 September 1942, 
Box 5, RG 181, NAFW. 
44 Report from Officer in Charge, Zone 2, to District Intelligence Officer, 8ND, 30 November 1942, Box 5, 
RG 181, NAFW. 
45 Intelligence Summary - Enemy Activity in the Eighth Naval District, December 1942, Box 27, RG 181, 
NAFW. 
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to gain the upper hand and pushed the U-boats back into the Atlantic.  However, operations in 
the Gulf did not cease.  ONI still monitored U-boat activity but the actions of enemy actors on 
the coast became a priority.  ONI was worried more about saboteurs coming ashore from the U-
boats than they wore about the U-boats still sinking ships. 
With the fear of attacks coming from within the country, ONI established ten intelligence 
zones to cover the entire Gulf Coast as well as some regions in the interior of the U.S.46  These 
intelligence zones existed prior to the cessation of the U-boat attacks in the Gulf but continued to 
operate long afterwards.  Monthly reports would cover the sea-based information.  These reports 
would note confirmed U-boat sightings as well as ship attacks.47  These monthly reports were 
often summaries of smaller reports detailing approximate positions of U-boats that were sighted.  
The commander of the Gulf Sea Frontier would make the approximation of the U-boat’s location 
and then send it off to the District Intelligence Officer.48  Even though the attacks stopped, there 
still was a suspicion that some U-boats continued to operate in the Gulf. 
ONI also handled intercepted enemy information.  Most of these interceptions detailed 
various tactics utilized by the U-boats to either increase their attacks or gather reconnaissance on 
the Gulf Coast.  An example of these interceptions come from a letter with an unnamed yet 
considered highly confidential source stated that U-boats were using lights to attract patrol and 
merchant ships into attacks.  That same letter also stated that German resupply ships were flying 
British flags and disguising themselves as merchant ships.  They would secretly have smaller 
motorboats on board that they would launch along with torpedoes and depth charges to attack 
 
46 Report from District Intelligence Officer to all Officers in Charge, 8ND, 34 August 1942, Box 5, RG 181, 
NAFW. 
47 List of Incident for the month of July 1942, 8ND, Box 2, RG 181, NAFW. 
48 Daily Intelligence Submarine Report for District Intelligence Officer, 8ND, 10 September 1942, Box 27, 
RG 181, NAFW. 
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other Allied ships that approached.49  Another report from the commandant of the Seventh Naval 
District to the Florida Sub-Sector detailed claims of German air reconnaissance.  The report 
claims that the U-boats were carrying collapsible planes meant for the reconnaissance of coastal 
activities.  The report calls for preparations to be made to counter and report any enemy air 
activity.50  It was intercepted messages and reports like these that had a major influence on how 
the military prepared for any possible attacks by the Germans, even if some of the claims were 
false. 
Map of Eighth Naval District Intelligence Zones, RG 181, Box 27. 
Internal Threats 
 The threat of enemy sabotage or raids from inside the country or from the sea created a 
level of paranoia among both local populations and military personnel.  A message from July 
1943 to the District Intelligence Officer warned of a potential landing in the area around Mobile, 
Alabama.  The report does not state where the information came from other than a call being 
 
49 Translation from confidential source, Box 24, RG 181, NAFW. 
50 Report from the Commandant, Seventh Naval District, to the Commanding General, Florida Sub-
Sector, 25 May 1942, Box 27, RG 181, NAFW. 
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made to the Coast Guard Tower in the area about an imminent landing.  The call demanded that 
all available men get to the beach.  This message went to various other members of the local 
Coast Guard command.  No landing ever occurred, and the message later states that the 
information came from a rumor that a U-boat was present offshore.  ONI could not find the 
source of this rumor as the area had been under normal curfew and due to the weather, no fishing 
boats had been out for several days.51 
 This message was not unique.  Rumors spread rapidly of possible landings and enemy 
saboteurs coming ashore.  Another report from July of 1943 stated that prisoners of war 
suggested that U-boats were performing mining operations as well as planting saboteurs posing 
as observers.52  ONI was so concerned about potential enemies within the country that they 
would follow nearly any lead that came to it.  In many cases, civilians would offer up 
information that they believed to be interesting to ONI, even if these civilians were not members 
of the Coastal Observation System.  One such person was Sara Mayfield from Alabama who had 
experience as a freelance reporter and was working for the District Postal Censor in New 
Orleans.  She claimed that she had information relevant to the refueling of U-boats and other 
undisclosed enemy actions.  Upon further investigation, all of Mayfield’s evidence consisted of 
excerpts and copies of newspaper articles relating to members of the Huey Long political 
machine.  ONI found no evidence of any wrongdoing in her reports.  ONI then suggested her 
termination from the District Postal Censor as she may continue to provide irrelevant 
 
51 Message from District Intelligence Officer, Panama City, to District Intelligence Officer, 8ND, 29 July 
1943, Box 2, RG 181, NAFW 
52 Message from Command of East Sea Frontier to all other Sea Frontier Commands, 28 July 1943, Box 
2, RG 181, NAFW. 
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information.53  Rumors were everywhere but ONI could not take the risk of not investigating 
these claims. 
 Many of these unsubstantiated claims came through the District Postal Censor and the 
District Cable Censor.  They hired numerous civilians to check the correspondence to ensure that 
no military secrets were being exchanged between soldiers and their families back home.54  The 
censors also listened to phone calls.  Usually when monitoring phone calls, the individuals on the 
call were already persons of interest.  Transcripts of these calls were distributed by ONI and in 
cases where enough information was found, they would intervene and take people in for 
questioning.55  In some cases arrests were even made on suspicious individuals.  A man named 
Karl Albert Kretschmer was arrested with charges of assisting the U-boats.  This particular claim 
was that Karl Kretschmer was the brother of Otto Kretschmer, a well-known U-Boat commander 
sometimes referred to as the “tonnage king” for the amount of tonnage he sunk.56  The 
information gained regarding the arrest of Kretschmer was minimal.  The report also claimed 
that a U-boat landing occurred in Mexico.  The report of Kretschmer’s arrest states that “little 
information concerning submarine refueling or the landing of enemy agents in Mexico has yet 
been definitely established, there are many reports about such activities, and it is entirely 
possible that they actually exist.”57  Once again, the reports were numerous, but the investigators 
lacked evidence to pursue any further action. 
 On occasion, some reports would have valuable information.  Another employee of the 
Postal Censorship in New Orleans named Mrs. Edward G. Williams provided some information 
 
53 Report from W. S. Hogg, District Intelligence Officer, to I. C. Levy, District Postal Censor, 10 January 
1944, Box 2, RG 181, NAFW. 
54 List of Cable Censor Personnel, 27 November 1943, Box 2, RG 181, NAFW. 
55 Telephone Censorship Log, February - April 1944, Box 2, RG 181, NAFW. 
56 Gannon, Operation Drumbeat, 30. 
57 Sub Activities Report, Box 15, RG 181, NAFW. 
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to ONI.  Mrs. Williams had owned a duplex in New Orleans with her husband but transferred the 
title of the duplex to a Mrs. Edward Bagley.  While still the owner of the duplex, Mrs. Williams 
leased the property to a Berthold Rasmus, who was the Chancellor of the German Consulate 
Office in New Orleans at the time.  Rasmus had since returned to Germany with the German 
Consul in New Orleans Edgar von Spiegel.  Mrs. Williams stated that while living in the duplex 
Rasmus and his family installed a high-powered radio receiver.  Mrs. Williams claimed that the 
machine sounded like a printing press when in operation.  The report notes that at the time, Mrs. 
Williams did not pay any particular note to this machine.58 
 After selling the property to Mrs. Bagley, Ramus and his family returned to Germany, the 
duplex was occupied by a German man named Alexander Albrecht and his family.  The report 
notes that, upon the declaration of war with Germany, Albrecht and his family were picked up by 
the FBI and were being held at an undisclosed location somewhere in the United States.  Since 
the Albrecht’s’ internment, a friend of the family named William Graves, Jr. moved into the 
duplex.  The report notes that Mrs. Williams believes that the radio equipment was still present 
upon Graves’ moving into the duplex and that Graves had expressed sympathy for the Albrecht 
family.  The report closes noting that Mrs. Williams was fearful that the radio equipment also 
included transmission facilities.59 
 The Albrechts were more direct examples of suspicious individuals.  In most cases, the 
information regarding potential enemy agents was not as concrete.  ONI assembled large list of 
suspicious individuals.  These lists included the names, addresses, occupations, and reasons for 
suspicion.  Even though Nazi sympathies and known ties to Germany were the main reasons for 
 
58 Report from Lieutenant J. P. Swift, U.S.N.R. Liaison Officer, Branch B, to The Officers in Charge, 
Section B-5 and Section B-7, 2 September 1942, Box 2, RG 181, NAFW. 
59 Ibid. 
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inclusion on the list, numerous individuals included on the list were of Japanese descent.  Any 
pro-Communist behavior, even just subscribing to Communist newspapers was enough to get put 
on these lists.60  It is possible that false allegations could result in a person’s name appearing on 
these lists, but very few people arrest occurred based on these suspicions.  There were also no 
reports of vigilantism amongst the local populace against any suspected individuals. 
The source of this information did largely come from the Coastal Observer System, but 
that program was not ONI’s sole means of intelligence among the civilian population.  There 
were numerous part time and full-time agents and special employees working directly for the 
naval district.61  These individuals were not concerned with the operations of sea crafts like the 
coastal observers’, their job was to find possible enemy agents in the United States.  Some of 
these special employees were civilian informants.  An example of these special employees was a 
prostitute from Morgan City, Louisiana, who was hired by naval intelligence to gather 
information from local fisherman and ship operators.62 
In some cases, even non-Americans were reported as working for ONI.  In October of 
1942, the Director of Naval Intelligence issued a letter to all district intelligence officers 
regarding the reporting of foreign aliens being employed as agents.  The purpose of this memo 
was for each district intelligence officer to detail the extent of a foreign agent’s work as many of 
these foreign agents had presented claims to the Department of Justice to seek exemption form 
 
60 Previously cited report from W. S. Hogg, DIO, to I. C. Levy, DPC 10 January 1944, Box 2, RG 181, 
NAFW. 
61 List of Special Employees to the Commandant, Eighth Naval District, from the Vice Chief of Naval 
Operations, 1 December 43, Box 15, RG 181, NAFW. 
62 Letter from Theodore Andress, Officer in Charge, Morgan City Branch to District Intelligence Officer, 
8ND, 02 November 1943, Box 15, RG 181, NAFW. 
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the Foreign Agents Registration Act and the Director of Naval Intelligence needed to prove the 
validity of these claims for exemption.63 
 While finding enemy agents within the United States could prove itself difficult.  ONI 
was aware of numerous enemy agents, primarily in Mexico and the Caribbean.  ONI had issued a 
list of names, addresses, and classifications for each individual on the list.  This list also included 
members of the German Consul in Mexico.64  A number of the records from the District 
Intelligence Officer started to focus heavily on Mexico.  On many occasions there was worry that 
U-boats were making landings in Mexico.  There was also concern that German agents would 
attempt to get across the U.S.-Mexico border. 
 ONI issued regular reports on various groups and organizations it was monitoring.  
Activity in Mexico had its own dedicated section.  In the subsection dedicated to German agents, 
most of the information covered known operatives and any updates on their whereabout and 
activity.  Mexican officials are noted as restricting these individual’s movement and even 
detaining them, yet the report lists that some unreliable Mexican officials impeded the 
effectiveness of these actions.  Additional concerns existed around the movement of refugees 
into Mexico as their political leanings were unknown and this was considered to be a potential 
threat.65 
 This shift in attention from the coastal waters to the U.S.-Mexico border was an early 
sign that the U-boat threat was all but gone.  The Battle of the Atlantic had returned to the 
Atlantic; but a threat did still exist in the Caribbean.  By August of 1943, even the monthly 
 
63 Memo from The Director of Naval Intelligence to all District Intelligence Officers, 23 October 1942, Box 
15, RG 181, NAFW. 
64 Names and addresses of known undercover agents in Mexico, Box 15, RG 181, NAFW. 
65 “Counter Intelligence Section B-7 Monthly Summary Eighth Naval District,” 30 September 1942, Box 
15, RG 181, NAFW. 
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counterintelligence summaries had shifted their focus.  Earlier in the war, German activities were 
listed first.  In the August 1943 report, the list placed communist activity first.  German activity 
had fallen to fourth on the list, behind Falangist activity.66  This was an indication that while a 
threat still existed, the priority had shifted.  By 1944, the Gulf of Mexico no longer experienced 
any attacks from U-boats. 
Conclusion 
The day after the official German surrender on May 7, 1945.  Admiral Harold M. 
Burrough of the Royal Navy, acting on behalf of the Supreme Commander, ordered all U-boats 
to surface and report their position to the nearest allied radio station.  The war was over, with the 
Battle of the Atlantic lasting nearly its entire duration.67  While the Gulf of Mexico was only a 
player in the Battle of the Atlantic for a short time, the number of merchant vessels lost proved to 
be a great success for the U-boats. 
 The Navy, Coast Guard, and the Army Air Forces did the active fighting against the U-
boat threat.  They patrolled the land, air, and sea and used every means possible to hunt U-boats 
and prevent any possible enemy landings on the Gulf Coast.  Yet they could not do it alone.  
They could do the fighting, but they required assistance from the civilian population to monitor 
the entire Gulf of Mexico. 
 It was the sailors who survived the sinkings that provided eyewitness accounts of U-boat 
tactics and the effectiveness of anti-submarine warfare.  Coastal observers that gave the 
intelligence that supplied the monthly intelligence reports.  Employees of the various censorship 
 
66 “Counter Intelligence Section B-7 Monthly Summary Eighth Naval District,” 31 August 1943, Box 15, 
RG 181, NAFW. 
67 Samuel Eliot Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II Volume 10 The 
Atlantic Battle Won May 1943 – May 1945 (Urbana and Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1956) 
359. 
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offices monitored suspicious communications.  These are just a handful of examples of the 
contributions made by civilians to the defense of the Gulf Coast.  Be it at sea, in the air, or on the 
shore, the civilian population was an invaluable asset to coastal defense.  Although, they 
hindered sometimes with false reports or inaccurate observations.  The urge to panic did exist, 
but not so much as to invalidate their contributions. 
 Even though this cooperative defense was not fully realized until after the U-boat threat 
had largely ended.  At the time, no one knew if the U-boats would return.  The war had yet to be 
decided.  Therefore, every precaution was taken in ensuring the defense of the Gulf Coast.  
Based on the increased defensive measures outlined in this paper, had the U-boat attacks 
continued beyond the summer of 1942, the combined efforts of the military and civilian 
population would have provided a much more capable defense against the U-boats.  Without the 
cooperative and collaborative efforts of the military and the civilian population, the Gulf of 
Mexico and its coast would have been at a greater risk from the German U-boats. 
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Notes on Sources 
The current literature related to the Battle of the Atlantic covers a wide range of material.  
The Battle of the Atlantic lasted for the duration of the war and spanned well beyond the Atlantic 
Ocean itself.  The exact details of the larger Battle of the Atlantic are well covered in various 
books, book chapters, and articles.  The most extensive sources for the entire war is Samuel Eliot 
Morison’s History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, which is a fifteen volume 
series.  The most relevant of Morison’s work comes from The Battle of the Atlantic, September 
1939 – May 1943 and The Atlantic Battle Won, May 1943 – May 1945, which are respectively 
volumes one and ten.  Some texts cover the U-boat’s first attacks on the Eastern seaboard like in 
the case of Michael Gannon’s Operation Drumbeat.  Some give detailed accounts of the sinkings 
and the reactions by the U.S. Navy for the duration of the war like in Jonathan Dimbleby’s The 
Battle of the Atlantic.  Other works just focus on the East Sea Frontier and the later success 
against the U-boats in 1943 such as Ed Offley’s Turning the Tide.  Others include the Battle of 
the Atlantic as a chapter in works that cover the entire Second World War, such as Williamson 
Murray and Allan Millett’s A War to be Won.  The records from the German side are used in 
some of these texts.  There is not much else to be said about where the attacks occurred and who 
the U-boats were sinking. 
 Many volumes exist that are more reference works than historical analysis.  U-boats 
Destroyed by Paul Kemp lists every German U-boat destroyed in both World Wars with various 
statistics including time, place, and brief notes about the circumstances of the sinkings.  U.S. 
Merchant Vessel War Casualties of World War II by Robert M. Browning Jr. provides statistics 
similar to Kemp but in regards to U.S. merchant vessels during the Second World War.  Axis 
Submarine Successes, 1939-1945 by Jürgen Rohwer provides a highly detailed list of German 
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attacks on allied ships.  In many cases, these reference books are cited in the other mentioned 
works.  Another compilation of U-boat related information is from a website titled 
https://uboat.net/ which acts as a similar reference resource, but it is information compiled by 
online contributors who are mostly transferring information from the printed reference books.  
However, the community that maintains the website keeps track of recent scholarship which 
allows access to more up to date information in cases where new information is found. 
 Operation Drumbeat is the most often covered topic of these books when focus in paid on 
the U-boats.  Operation Drumbeat is often the center of attention as it was the beginning of the 
U-boats’ assault on the U.S. and many of these texts cover how the U.S. was unprepared for 
these attacks.  From Operation Drumbeat in early 1942 until early 1943, this was the time where 
most of the sinkings occurred and where many of these texts like to detail the locations of these 
sinkings and tell about the U-boats and their commanders.  A lot of focus in these books is based 
on the point of view of the U-boats and their encounters with both the merchant marines and the 
military.  The focus of these texts then shifts to later in 1943 where the tides turned and the U.S., 
along with other allied forces, started to gain the upper hand and eventually win the Battle of the 
Atlantic.  In the case of these texts, most of the focus is on the U-boats and when a region is 
specified it is almost always in the Atlantic Ocean. 
When covering the Gulf of Mexico, also known as the Gulf Sea Frontier, very little exist 
on the topic.  In most cases, the Gulf Sea Frontier gets a brief mention or a small chapter in a 
larger work covering U-boat activity, such as in U-boat Assault on America by Ken Brown.  The 
same can be found in Torpedo Junction by Homer Hickam Jr.  These texts offer well-researched 
insights on the U-boat campaign, but their attention tends to fall on the Atlantic proper.  Even 
when covering the Gulf, the focus is almost entirely on the sinkings and little focus is paid on the 
27 
 
coastline itself and how these sinkings were affecting the homeland.  There is a degree of 
coverage over the changes in U.S. anti-submarine warfare in response to the German U-boat 
attacks, but most of this focus happens to be in the Atlantic and the Caribbean. 
 There are a few works that look directly into the impact of the U-boats on the Gulf Coast.  
Melanie Wiggins’ Torpedoes in the Gulf is the most prolific text on this subject matter.  Her 
book covers primarily the impact of U-boat activity on Galveston, Texas as well as providing a 
detailed account of the attacks in the Gulf from the perspective of the U-boats.  Wiggins’ writing 
tells practically all someone would need to know about where the U-boats were and when they 
were attacked for the duration of 1942 until the U.S. started to succeed and push back against the 
U-boats in 1943.  Wiggins does provide many accounts from newspapers but most of those 
accounts are centered around Galveston. 
 The other works that are similar to Wiggins are much more local in scope.  Jerry P. 
Sanson’s Louisiana During World War II covers politics and society for the duration of the war.  
However, Sanson primarily covers the political changes in Louisiana during the war as well as 
the increase in industry due to wartime demand, but not so much the impact of the U-boats.  A 
self-published book titled WWII in the Gulf of Mexico by C. J. Christ covers a wide variety of 
topics, albeit each topic is covered briefly.  The book is not so much a book, but an omnibus of 
short articles based on information that Christ gathered over the years.  These articles offer a 
more local look at the war in southern Louisiana.  Christ does not provide any citations for his 
information, but it is inferred in many of his articles that his information came from speaking 
with people who were alive at the time.  His input offers a collection of local voices that no 
longer exist.  Much of Christ’s information also comes from some of the other texts covering the 
larger Battle of the Atlantic that were previously discussed in this paper.  An article written by 
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Jason P. Theriot titled “Cajun Country during World War II” published in Louisiana History: 
The Journal of Louisiana Historical Association, covers similar topics that both Christ and 
Sanson write about, in which Theriot cites both of them extensively. 
 When considering the combined works of Wiggins, Sanson, Christ, and Theriot, a fair 
amount of information is covered, but many holes still exist.  Wiggins presents a well-researched 
examination of the U-boats. She gives a little attention to the U-Boats impact on the U.S. Gulf 
Coast, but mostly in relation to Galveston.  Sanson covers politics extensively but has very little 
crossover with the topics covered by Wiggins.  Christ and Theriot both provide the most local 
look at the war from the perspectives of people who witnessed the events first hand.  There is a 
lot of overlap between these sources, but there are also a lot of holes.  The larger reactions from 
both the military and the civilian population across the Gulf Coast is partially touched on in these 
texts but not extensively.  The reactions by the civilian population are covered by Christ and 
Theriot while the military is covered by Wiggins, and yet she focuses more on what was 
happening off the coast. 
 Overall, the literature on the Battle of the Atlantic is quite extensive.  Considering the 
fighting in the Atlantic lasted the duration of the war this is no surprise.  Yet the Gulf Sea 
Frontier tends to be overlooked due to the brevity of the action that occurred in its waters.  Of the 
previously mentioned texts, those that do address the Gulf and the events that transpired within it 
tend to focus solely on the sinkings.  Primarily when and where these sinkings occurred.  This 
leaves a gap in knowledge of the activities on the Gulf Coast itself and the heavy involvement of 
the civilian population in the defense of the Gulf Coast.  
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